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REASSESSING THE JUDICIAL EMPATHY DEBATE: 









The things that make a good Judge, or good Interpreter of the Laws, 
are, first, A right understanding of that principal Law of Nature called Eq-
uity; which depending not on the reading of other mens Writings, but on 
the goodness of a mans own natural Reason, and Meditation, is presumed 
to be in those most, that have had most leisure, and had the most inclination 
to meditate thereon. Secondly, Contempt of Unnecessary Riches, and Pre-
ferments. Thirdly, To be able in judgment to devest himself of all fear, an-
ger, hatred, love, and compassion. Fourthly, and lastly, Patience to hear; 
diligent attention in hearing; and memory to retain, digest and apply what 
he hath heard.1 
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 1. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 146–47 (London, Andrew Crooke 1651). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Judges are supposed to be impartial arbiters of justice. They weigh the 
merits of cases and decide punishments for convicted defendants. With 
these responsibilities comes power over criminal defendants’ lives. Yet be-
cause judges are human, their minds operate through similar cognitive pro-
cesses as any other human mind. In practice, this means that their power is 
not always exercised impartially and may be subject to the same innocent, 
yet insidious, cognitive deficits and biases experienced by humanity at large. 
To be a judge is, then, to be a human trying to relate facts to law while 
deciding cases and ambiguities in the most just manner. The case of judicial 
empathy in criminal sentencing is a particularly challenging issue, as it is an 
example of how human processing may affect another person’s rights and 
freedoms. Empathy allows judges to more fully understand the situations of 
the parties in front of them, but it also introduces empathetic bias into the 
judicial process. 
Assessing empathy’s effects on judicial sentencing is important, as dis-
parate empathy likely causes significant racial disparities within the criminal 
justice system.2 Disparate empathy against Black Americans may change 
trial outcomes3 and contribute to disparate levels of capital sentencing.4 It 
also contributes to longer prison sentences for Black Americans.5 
This paper investigates the role empathy plays in the judicial decision-
making process, for better or worse. To do this, it first explores the judicial 
empathy debate and identifies what empathy is. It then explores connections 
between empathy, bias, and punishment, and relates these conclusions to 
judges and the sentencing process. Finally, it concludes with suggestions on 
how judges may improve their decision-making. Empathy is a near-universal 
human experience and judges can effectively regulate and employ it to pos-
itive ends, particularly when working within their wide sentencing discretion. 
                                                           
 2. Douglas O. Linder, Juror Empathy and Race, 63 TENN. L. REV. 887, 901–02 (1996) 
(“The low probability that white jurors will empathize with African-American defendants is 
not simply a function of race, but also of the linguistic, cultural, experiential, and economic 
differences that divide white and blacks in America.”). 
 3. See id. at 907 (describing the effects of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)). 
 4. Id. at 908–10 (“The ability of white jurors to empathize more easily with white vic-
tims than black victims contributes to race-of-victim disparities.”). 
 5. M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Sentences, 
122 J. POL. ECON. 1320, 1327 (2014) (stating that studies have generally shown “that prose-
cutors favor white defendants”). 
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II. EMPATHY AND BIAS: CLARIFYING TERMS AND COGNI-
TIVE PROCESSES 
This section first defines empathy, and then discusses how it works 
within the brain. Contemporary debates about empathy tend to employ var-
ying definitions of empathy, so such clarification is important before discuss-
ing empathy’s effects on the judicial system. 
A. The Contemporary Debate Conflates Empathy with Other Issues 
The debate as to whether empathy is valuable in the judicial decision-
making process was reignited when President Barack Obama, shortly after 
Justice David Souter’s retirement, said, “I view that quality of empathy, of 
understanding and identifying with people’s hopes and struggles as an es-
sential ingredient for arriving at just decisions and outcomes.”6 Since then, 
the debate reignites occasionally, such as when a Santa Clara County Supe-
rior Court judge issued a light sentence to a Stanford University student con-
victed of rape.7 In 2018, the topic came up surrounding then-Judge Ka-
vanaugh’s Supreme Court confirmation hearings.8 When these debates 
occur, some argue that judicial decision-making requires impartiality and 
emotional distance, while others argue that empathy is a critical ingredient 
of just decision-making.9 
One paper, for example, distills criticism of judicial empathy into four 
main arguments.10 The first criticism is that empathy might blind a judge to 
                                                           
 6. Jesse Lee, The President’s Remarks on Justice Souter, THE WHITE HOUSE: PRES-
IDENT BARACK OBAMA BLOG (May 1, 2009, 4:23 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.ar-
chives.gov/blog/2009/05/01/presidents-remarks-justice-souter (describing the elements that 
President Obama will consider in selecting a replacement for Justice Souter). 
 7. Jill Suttie, Do We Need More Empathetic Judges?, GREATER GOOD MAG. (June 
22, 2016), https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/article/item/do_we_need_more_em-
pathic_judges (“In pronouncing the sentence, the judge seemed to show more empathy for 
the perpetrator, who went to the same university as [the judge], than the rape victim, who 
didn’t.”). 
 8. Compare Steven Greenhouse, SeaWorld’s and Kavanaugh’s Missing Empathy 
Gene, AM. PROSPECT (Sept. 21, 2018) (criticizing one of then-judge Kavanaugh’s dissents, 
where he argued that SeaWorld should not be subject to OSHA regulations, on empathy 
grounds), with Ruben Navarrette Jr., Kavanaugh’s Emotions Showed He’s Human. That’s a 
Good Thing in a Supreme Court Justice, USA TODAY (Oct. 18, 2018) (“I like my judges 
with an emotional streak. It reminds me they’re human. It’s the robotic ones who terrify me. 
I want judges who show compassion and empathy when needed, but also anger and outrage 
when appropriate.”). 
 9. Judicial Empathy, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/judicial_empathy (last vis-
ited May 2, 2020) (outlining the arguments for and against judicial empathy). 
 10. Lucia Corso, Should Empathy Play any Role in the Interpretation of Constitutional 
Rights?, 27 RATIO JURIS. 94, 100 (2014). 
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the “formally logical” elements of the law.11 The second argues in favor of a 
tranquil legal mind, claiming that empathy “may alter the dispassionate men-
tal attitude necessary to formulate good judgments.”12 The third argument 
criticizes moral sentimentalism, which might cause a judge to eschew the law 
in favor of sympathy or compassion.13 The last argument contends that 
judges must favor the law over their own views or opinions.14 For critics of 
empathy, judges must prevent empathy from shifting their determination of 
the law, as they should make impartial decisions based on empirical meth-
ods.15 For example, an “anti-empathy” person might argue that if an ambig-
uous case arises, the judge must only consider their best approximation of 
the law, without relying upon empathy.16 
Those in favor of empathy argue that judicial empathy towards minor-
ity populations enables judges to uphold minority rights and understand the 
minority experience.17 On this view, empathy enables judges to understand 
“all sides” of an issue.18 Proponents of judicial diversity might argue that di-
verse benches better empathize with less privileged litigants.19 Some in the 
                                                           
 11. Id. at 100 (stating that determining “the largest possible number of major premises 
from which to infer conclusions for single cases” is clouded by “emotions, personal points 
of view, and personal memories of the individual judge”). 
 12. Id. at 100 (asserting that a tranquil mind allows “a certain degree of detachment and 
disinterest” necessary for impartiality). 
 13. See id. at 101. 
 14. See id. at 101–02. 
 15. See Ilya Somin, Understanding the Point at Issue in the Judicial Empathy Debate, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 29, 2009), http://volokh.com/2009/05/29/understanding-the-
point-at-issue-in-the-judicial-empathy-debate/ (“When critics of the Ledbetter decision claim 
that the conservative justices lacked ‘empathy’ for the plaintiff, they mean not that the con-
servative justices were unaware of her feelings, but that they failed to identify with them suf-
ficiently.”). 
 16. See Orin Kerr, Legal Ambiguity, Empathy, and the Role of Judicial Power, VO-
LOKH CONSPIRACY (May 13, 2009, 5:51 PM), http://volokh.com/2009/05/13/legal-ambigu-
ity-empathy-and-the-role-of-judicial-power/ (“To those who see legal ambiguity as inviting a 
careful judicial weighing—indeed, who think that the critical role of a judge is to engage in 
that careful judicial weighing—emphasizing the need for ‘empathy’ is an invitation to replace 
law with politics.”). 
 17. Erwin Chemerinsky, Is There a Conflict Between Empathy and Good Judging?, 
LA TIMES (May 28, 2009, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-oew-
chemerinsky-somin28-2009may28-story.html (“In fact, all justices as human beings inevitably 
feel empathy. Most of today’s Supreme Court justices apparently feel it more for businesses 
than employees, and more for victims of crimes than criminal defendants. Obama’s wish that 
justices feel empathy for minorities and the poor should hardly be controversial, for the 
Constitution above all exists to protect minorities. The majority generally doesn’t need a 
constitution for its protection because it can control the political process.”). 
 18. See Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of Judicial Empathy, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1944, 
1964–66 (2012) (describing how judges might use empathy to relate to multiple sides of liti-
gation). 
 19. See id. at 2001–02 (“President Obama wants to make sure that he appoints judges 
who can also empathize with those whose experiences tend to be very far afield from those 
of most judges.”). 
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pro-empathy camp acknowledge that empathy has positive and negative as-
pects in a judge’s ability to decide cases.20 
The long-entrenched debate about judicial empathy may have staying 
power for several reasons. First, discussing emotions objectively is difficult. 
Emotional terminology changes over time and lacks fixed meaning in pop-
ular conversation.21 Discourse among legal critics defines “empathy” in var-
ious ways, sometimes conflating it with bias and sometimes with justice.22 
The confusion may also occur because “empathy” has become shorthand 
for political orientation, with some viewing “liberal” positions as ones that 
entail empathy, and “conservative” positions as ones that incorporate other 
moral foundations, such as loyalty, authority, or sanctity.23 Still, this is likely 
a simplification of political discourse, as figures from across the political 
spectrum appeal to empathy to defend their positions, even if those posi-
tions are on different sides of the same issue.24 
                                                           
 20. See Chemerinsky, supra note 17 (arguing that empathy can increase a judge’s ability 
to relate to those in the courtroom but may also impede accurate evaluation of cases). 
 21. Susan A. Bandes, Compassion and the Rule of Law, 13 INT’L. J.L. CONTEXT 184, 
185 (2017). 
 22. Compare Somin, supra note 15 (“When critics of the Ledbetter decision claim that 
the conservative justices lacked ‘empathy’ for the plaintiff, they mean not that the conserva-
tive justices were unaware of her feelings, but that they failed to identify with them suffi-
ciently.”), and Steven G. Calabresi, Op-Ed., Obama’s “Redistribution” Constitution, WALL 
ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122515067227674187 (last updated Oct. 28, 2008, 
12:01 AM) (“[Obama] believes—and he is quite open about this—that judges ought to decide 
cases in light of the empathy they ought to feel for the little guy in any lawsuit.”), with Colby, 
supra note 18, at 1958 (quoting Empathy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 
(11th ed. 2003)) (“Empathy is ‘the action of understanding, being aware of, being sensitive 
to, and vicariously experiencing the feelings, thoughts, and experience of another of either 
the past or present without having the feelings, thoughts, and experience fully communicated 
in an objectively explicit manner; also: the capacity for this.’”). 
 23. See PAUL BLOOM, AGAINST EMPATHY 120 (Dec. 6, 2016) (discussing Jonathan 
Haidt’s proposal that liberals and conservatives operate from different moral foundations, as 
well as the relationship between political discourse and empathy). 
 24. See id. at 81–82 (“Political debates typically involve a disagreement not over 
whether we should empathize, but over who we should empathize with . . . . [I]n late 2014, 
ex-vice-president Dick Cheney was asked to defend the United States’ record on torture. 
Now you might imagine that his argument would involve abstract appeals to security and 
safety. And yet when asked to define torture, Cheney gave this example: ‘an American citizen 
on a cell phone making a last call to his four young daughters shortly before he burns to 
death in the upper levels of the Trade Center in New York City on 9/11.’ This is an empathic 
argument, defending torture by talking about the suffering of a single identifiable individ-
ual.”); JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY 
POLITICS AND RELIGION 160 (2013) (comparing political signs from different perspectives 
that appeal to fairness and equality). 
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Recent accounts of judicial empathy primarily address common psy-
chology, discussing prejudice and bias without addressing the neural corre-
lates of empathy. 25 A full account of the effects of empathy on judges must 
first account for how human brains experience empathy.26 Defining empa-
thy before locating its role in judicial decision-making and sentencing can 
help refine the debate. 
B. What is Empathy? 
Empathy may be conflated with compassion, perspective-taking, or in-
formed experience.27 The neuroscientific study of empathy refines the de-
bate, providing insights into how empathy operates in the brain and its pos-
sible effects on people. 
Empathy is a complex, not fully understood, process. Scientists have 
broken empathy down into the capacity to feel for others, called “emotional 
empathy” or “affective empathy,”28 and “cognitive empathy,” the ability to 
take another person’s perspective.29 
Other frameworks discuss responses to the experience of empathy, in-
cluding “compassionate empathy,” which is one’s response to experiencing 
of empathy,30 and “emotional self-regulation,” which addresses the neural 
inhibition of empathy so people can function while experiencing empathy.31 
Emotional self-regulation helps contribute to the “self/other” divide, which 
keeps personal emotions separate from empathetically-experienced emo-
tions.32 Empathetic responses may also be categorized as “compassion,” 
which manifests as concern for the target, and “empathic distress,” which 
                                                           
 25. See Susan A. Bandes, Moral Imagination in Judging, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 1 (2011) 
(“The empathy debate has revealed a tenaciously hardy folk conception of judicial delibera-
tion and the judicial role.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Gary Low, Emphatic Plea for the Empathic Judge, 30 SINGAPORE ACAD. 
L. J. 97, 97 (2018). 
 27. Id. at 105 (“Modern scholarship on the subject is confusing, contributed chiefly by 
divergent or overlapping meanings of empathy.”); see, e.g., Colby supra note 18, at 1952–54 
(discussing the various ways in which people perceive empathy in judging). 
 28. Robert Eres & Pascal Molenberghs, The Influence of Group Membership on the 
Neural Correlates Involved in Empathy, 7 FRONTIERS IN HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE Art. 176 
at 1 (2013). 
 29. Simone G. Shamay-Tsoory, Editorial, Dynamic Functional Integration of Distinct 
Neural Empathy Systems, 9 SOCIAL, COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1–2 (2014). 
 30. Sandip Roy, 5 Dangers Of Empathy: How Can Empathy Hurt You Bad, HAPPI-
NESS INDIA PROJECT, https://happyproject.in/empathy-hurts/ (last visited May 2, 2020). 
 31. Eres & Molenberghs supra note 28, at 3. 
 32. Kim Armstrong, ‘I Feel Your Pain’: The Neuroscience of Empathy, 31 ASSOC. PSY-
CHOLOGICAL SCI. 29, 30 (2017) (describing studies associated with the self/other divide). 
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manifests as personal distress over feelings of empathy.33 Note that “com-
passion” may be a response to feelings of empathy, but it is a separate expe-
rience,34 with different affective responses and different neurological signa-
tures.35 
When we see someone in a highly emotional situation, “mirror” neu-
rons in our brain activate, reflecting the target’s perceived state in our own 
brain.36 Scientists hypothesize that these mirror neurons “enable us to un-
derstand other people’s actions in terms of our own movements and 
goals . . . .”37 Though the role of mirror neurons within systems of human 
empathy may have been over-hyped,38 and once-expansive claims about 
their predominance have come into question in recent years,39 social neuro-
                                                           
 33. Tania Singer & Olga M. Klimecki, Empathy and Compassion, 24 CURRENT BIOL-
OGY R875, R875 (2014) (“[A]n empathic response to suffering can result in two kinds of 
reactions: empathic distress, which is also referred to as personal distress; and compassion, 
which is also referred to as empathic concern or sympathy.”). 
 34. Larry Stevens & Jasmine Benjamin, The Brain that Longs to Care for Others: The 
Current Neuroscience of Compassion, in THE NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY, COMPASSION, 
AND SELF-COMPASSION 55 (Larry Stevens & C. Chad Woodruff, eds., Academic Press 2018) 
(“[Compassion] differs from Empathy in that empathy is the general vicarious experiencing 
or sharing of another person’s emotional state, not just their suffering. Empathy lacks the 
motivational component of compassion.”). 
 35. Id. at 56–62 (summarizing neurological studies on compassion, breaking down the 
neural correlates of compassion into nine affective regions). 
 36. Jaime A Pineda, Sensorimotor Cortex as a Critical Component of an ‘Extended” 
Mirror Neuron System: Does it Solve the Development, Correspondence, and Control 
Problems in Mirroring?, 4 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN FUNCTIONS (Oct. 18, 2008), https://behav-
ioralandbrainfunctions.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1744-9081-4-47. 
 37. Ben Thomas, What’s So Special About Mirror Neurons?, SCI. AM. GUEST BLOG 
(Nov. 6, 2012), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/whats-so-special-about-mir-
ror-neurons/. 
 38. See J.M. Kilner & R.N. Lemon, What We Know Currently About Mirror Neurons, 
23 CURRENT BIOLOGY R1057, R1057 (2013) (“Indeed so much has been written about mir-
ror neurons that last year they were referred to, rightly or wrongly, as ‘The most hyped con-
cept in neuroscience’. Here we try to cut through some of this hyperbole and review what is 
currently known (and not known) about mirror neurons.”). 
 39. See Susan Lanzoni, Empathetic Brains, in EMPATHY: A HISTORY 251, 252 (Yale 
University Press 2018) (“[T]he expansive claims that mirror neurons subserve the under-
standing of actions, the capacity to empathize, and even the use of language have recently 
come under critique.”); see also GREGORY HICKOK, THE MYTH OF MIRROR NEURONS: THE 
REAL NEUROSCIENCE OF COMMUNICATION AND COGNITION (2014) (offering a comprehen-
sive rebuttal of mirror neuron theory by one of its most prominent critics). 
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scientists still acknowledge that various forms of empathy have automati-
cally-triggered neural correlates.40 Mirror neurons play a role in empathy,41 
as do other neurological systems.42 Examples of other neural triggers for em-
pathy include the limbic system and the neurotransmitter oxytocin.43 The 
“insula, amygdala, and anterior cingulate cortex” also help regulate affective 
empathy.44 Regardless as to which neurological correlate manifests empathy, 
highly emotional situations elicit neurological state-matching reactions.45 
Some of these brain systems create emotional contagion, which is when 
one’s mental state reflects that of the person they see.46 As people become 
more empathetic, networks in the brain connecting theory of mind (concep-
tualization of other mental states) to embodied simulation (our ability to 
reflect a perceived action’s goal-state) fire.47 
In summary, our brains appear to automatically respond to highly 
emotional situations, reflecting the perceived neural state. This likely causes 
us to mimic the emotions we perceive. For the sake of scientific accuracy 
                                                           
 40. LANZONI, supra note 39, at 252 (“If the mirror neuron literature views empathy as 
an automatic neural simulation, other neuroscientific models characterize empathy as an 
emotionally regulated feeling response, sensitive to social context and dependent on an 
awareness of the difference between the self and the other. Different empathies have been 
found to possess different neural correlates: emotional contagion has neural patterns distinct 
from perspective taking, for instance. Some contend, however, that emotional contagion, as 
well as self-oriented perspective taking, is only pseudo-empathy and should not be called 
empathy at all.”). 
 41. John Mark Taylor, Mirror Neurons After a Quarter Century: New Light, New 
Cracks, HARVARD UNIVERSITY: THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES: SCIENCE 
IN THE NEWS BLOG (July 25, 2016), http://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2016/mirror-neurons-
quarter-century-new-light-new-cracks/ (“[I]t is important to remember that despite recent crit-
icism, [mirror neuron] activity may still play an important role in many behaviors.”). 
 42. Vera Flasbeck et al., The Brain that Feels Into Others: Toward a Neuroscience of 
Empathy, in THE NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY, COMPASSION, AND SELF-COMPASSION 23, 
34–35 (Larry Stevens & C. Chad Woodruff eds., 2018). 
 43. Id. at 35. 
 44. David D. Vachon, Donald R. Lynam & Jarrod A. Johnson, The (Non)Relation 
Between Empathy and Aggression: Surprising Results From a Meta-Analysis, 140 PSYC. 
BULL. 751, 752 (2014). 
 45. See generally Flasbeck et al., supra note 42 at 28 (“From a proximate perspective, 
perceiving the affective state of a target individual activates autonomic responses that may (or 
may not) result in empathy.”). 
 46. See id. at 24 (“Hence, [emotional contagion’s] behavioral correlate is restricted to 
the display of the same behavior as that perceived in the initiating individual.”); Simone G. 
Shamay-Tsoory, Dynamic Functional Integration of Distinct Neural Empathy Systems, 9 
SOC., COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1, 2 (2014), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3871737/pdf/nst107.pdf (“The existence of 
mirror neurons related to emotional facial expressions in the human [inferior frontal gyrus] 
suggests that the human [mirror neurons system] may be used to convert observed facial 
expressions into a pattern of neural activity that would be suitable for producing similar facial 
expressions and would provide the neural basis for emotional contagion.”). 
 47. See Vittorio Gallese, Mirror Neurons, Embodied Simulation, and the Neural Basis 
of Social Identification, 19 INT’L J. RELATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 519, 524 (Oct. 15, 2009) (dis-
cussing how social identification is built and what neural mechanisms enable its emergence). 
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and clarity, this paper will therefore refer to “empathy” as embodied per-
spective-taking. It is an automatic process that all people experience. 
C. The Relationship Between Empathy and Bias 
Empathy can lead to cognitive distortion in several ways. It can narrow 
a judge’s perspective, cause a judge to over-value one perspective over oth-
ers, can cause benevolence or aggression, and can result in disparate impact. 
As discussed above, empathy is primarily a mechanism for perspective-
taking. Because empathy often involves individual perspective-taking, it can 
draw the judge’s attention away from the good of a collective.48 This may 
actually be desirable if, for instance, it enables a judge to weigh the social 
value of punishment against the harm of such punishment to an individual. 
Still, it may cause the judge to overvalue an individual’s perspective, or to 
reduce complex socio-legal considerations to a mere conflict between two 
parties. This may undermine the collective good and make judges take less 
prudent actions.49 These effects occur even when participants believe their 
decision will be public.50 For this reason, the publicity of judges’ written de-
cisions does not protect against the effects of empathy bias. 
Another issue with empathy and bias is the possibility of “imaginative 
resistance,” a phenomenon in which people find it difficult to empathize 
with different moral frameworks from their own.51 Understanding imagina-
tive resistance might enable judges to engage in critical, neutral reflection on 
alternative moral perspectives by “plac[ing] rational demands on the view-
points of the simulator and his target.”52 Though some may argue that sen-
tencing judges should not probe “into the motives that led the defendant to 
commit a crime,”53 an understanding of such motives might be essential to 
assessing an offender’s mental state, and the correspondingly appropriate 
punishment. 
                                                           
 48. See C. Daniel Batson & Nadia Y. Ahmad, Empathy-Induced Altruism: A Threat 
to the Collective Good, 26 ADVANCES IN GROUP PROCESSES: ALTRUISM AND PROSOCIAL 
BEHAVIOR IN GROUPS 1, 18 (2009) (discussing the results of an experiment that introduces 
egotistic and altruistic motives separately and its impact on the collective good). 
 49. Id. at 14–15 (explaining the results of an experiment measuring empathic concern). 
 50. Id. at 16–17 (explaining the results of an experiment introducing egoistic and altru-
istic motives separately). 
 51. Karsten R. Stueber, Imagination, Empathy, and Moral Deliberation: The Case of 
Imaginative Resistance, 49 SOUTHERN J. PHIL. 156, 160 (2011) (“The examples also reveal 
that imaginative resistance does point to some real limits and real difficulties in making sense 
of another person’s point of view, particularly in moral matters.”). 
 52. Id. at 175. 
 53. Corso, supra note 10, at 103 (defending empathy in the constitutional law context 
while dismissing it in the criminal context). 
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Sometimes, empathy may have positive effects. For example, there is 
much support for the hypothesis that empathy causes altruism.54 This altru-
ism comes in the form of care for the other person’s welfare.55 It often man-
ifests as compassion, inclining people to treat the subject of their empathy 
with kindness.56 
Empathy also has other, less intuitive effects. For example, empathy 
does not necessarily only flow to the disenfranchised side in litigation. 
Judges may empathize with corporate or government litigants, or may have 
empathy for all parties in a case.57 Empathy also does not only cause proso-
cial behavior towards the target but can also facilitate aggression on behalf 
of the target’s interest.58 It may also cause judges to identify with enraged 
aggressors, treating aggression more charitably as the target of empathy.59 
Finally, if someone feels overwhelming empathy, it may prevent them from 
acting altruistically.60 
These aggression-triggering effects are important to note for the judi-
cial sentencing context, as harsh facts in a violent trial may invite a judge to 
sentence a defendant harshly on a victim’s behalf. Notably, more or broader 
empathy may not be the solution to combat empathy-induced aggression. A 
meta-analysis of affective empathy and aggression studies determined that 
empathy has minimal effect on the inhibition of aggression.61 
                                                           
 54. Batson & Ahmad, supra note 48, at 23. 
 55. Id. at 7 (defining altruism “as [a] motivational state with the ultimate goal of increas-
ing another person’s welfare”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Bandes, supra note 21, at 192 (discussing distinctions between empathy and com-
passion in the judicial process). 
 58. Anneke E. K. Buffone & Michael J. Poulin, Empathy, Target Distress, and Neuro-
hormone Genes Interact to Predict Aggression for Others–Even Without Provocation, 40 
PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1406, 1418 (2014) (“The present research found 
that assessed or elicited empathy predicted aggression to benefit a distressed empathy target, 
and that the effect of empathy may be partially explained by the empathy-linked neurohor-
mones vasopressin and oxytocin.”). 
 59. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 361, 376 (1996) (“Consider, for example, the dark underbelly of empathy, as 
illustrated in a recent notorious case. In that case, the defendant found his wife in bed with 
another man at midnight, chased the man away, drank and argued with his wife until four 
a.m., and then fatally shot her in the head with a hunting rifle. A Baltimore County Circuit 
Court judge sentenced the defendant to eighteen months in prison for voluntary manslaugh-
ter, saying ‘I seriously wonder how many men married five, four years would have the 
strength to walk away without inflicting some corporal punishment.’ The judge’s reaction was 
the one that came most easily––prereflective and self-referential.”). 
 60. Steve Taylor, Negative Empathy, PSYCH. TODAY (May 12, 2016), https://www.psy-
chologytoday.com/us/blog/out-the-darkness/201605/negative-empathy. 
 61. See generally Vachon, Lynam & Johnson, supra note 44, at 754 (summarizing the 
meta-analysis). 
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Finally, empathy may result in racial disparities. Some studies focusing 
on this phenomenon measure amygdala activation to assess empathy lev-
els.62 The amygdala is a set of neurons involved in the limbic system, respon-
sible for processing emotions and fear responses.63 These studies have 
found that the brain distinguishes between in-group and out-group mem-
bers, and greater amygdala activation occurs when people see fear in the 
faces of people of their own race.64 Less activation occurs when seeing fear 
in a person of a different race’s face.65 When people see their own race ex-
periencing physical pain, they experience more amygdala activation than 
when they see a different race in physical pain.66 The empathetic reactions 
to fear and pain may be amplified in more collectivist societies.67 These find-
ings are important to consider in the sentencing context, as it may be more 
difficult for typically white, male judges68 to empathize with minority defend-
ants than white,69 well-educated prosecutors and victims of all stripes.70 
Empathy entails emotional entanglement with the subject of the empa-
thy. Colloquially, it is “putting oneself in another’s shoes.”71 It can be com-
passionate, but it also can cause negative or antisocial consequences. For 
these reasons, empathy may properly be considered amoral, with positive 
and negative effects.72 
                                                           
 62. See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 32 (introducing the neuroscience of empathy). 
 63. Amygdala, SCIENCEDAILY, https://www.sciencedaily.com/terms/amygdala.htm (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2020). 
 64. See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 32, at 29, 31 (“Cultural emphasis on ingroups and 
outgroups may create an ‘empathy gap’ between people of different races and nationali-
ties . . . .” “People have been found to show greater activation in the amygdala when viewing 
fearful faces of their own race . . . .”). 
 65. Id. at 31. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. (“One study comparing the in-group/out-group bias in Korea, a more collectivist 
society, and the United States, a more individualistic society, found that more interdependent 
societies may foster a greater sense of in-group favoritism in the brain.”). 
 68. See Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, Am. Const. Soc’y, The Gavel Gap: Who 
Sits in Judgment on State Courts? 7 (2016) (finding that more than half of state trial judges 
and state appellate judges are white men). 
 69. See Amita Kelly, Does It Matter That 95 Percent of Elected Prosecutors Are 
White?, NPR (July 8, 2015, 4:59 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpoli-
tics/2015/07/08/420913118/does-it-matter-that-95-of-elected-prosecutors-are-white (noting 
that 95 percent of the country’s elected prosecutors are white and 83 percent are men). 
 70. See generally BUREAU JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T JUST., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 
2018: SUMMARY (Sept. 2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv18_sum.pdf (illustrat-
ing a wide range of victim types). 
 71. See BLOOM, supra note 25, at 41 (“[R]egardless of how one describes it, we’ll see 
that there are many people who really do think morality is rooted in empathy in the sense 
that I am discussing here, people who talk about the importance of standing in another’s 
shoes, feeling their pain, and so on.”). 
 72. Batson & Ahmad, supra note 48, at 6–7. 
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D. How Cognitive Process Theories Illuminate Solutions 
Given that human empathy is an automatic system that can affect de-
cision-making in both positive and negative ways, it is important to discuss 
cognitive systems that may help mitigate its negative effects. Theories of cog-
nitive processes divide human processing into two systems: System 1 and 
System 2.73 System 1 processes are rapid and autonomous, whereas System 
2 processes are “higher order,” often entailing reasoning, hypothetical think-
ing, and working memory.74 Much of our lives are spent using System 1 pro-
cesses.75 When someone thinks deeply, they engage System 2 processes.76 
System 2 processes can intervene in System 1 processes, overriding default 
responses.77 Emotions and decisions often come before justifications,78 and 
rational thought processes may play less of a role in our decision-making 
than it seems.79 
Though these conclusions may become more nuanced over time,80 it 
is likely that they form a framework by which people can modify and check 
their impulses and autonomic responses to stimuli.81 For example, if a judge 
notices that their natural empathy is causing them to side in one direction, 
cognitive theories suggest that this judge might override their cognition, en-
abling reflective decision-making. At least one person has already appealed 
to dual-process systems to justify empathetic judging in general.82 Empathy 
                                                           
 73. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 20–21 (2013) (“System 1 oper-
ates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control. Sys-
tem 2 allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex 
computations. The operations of System 2 are often associated with the subjective experience 
of agency, choice, and concentration.”). 
 74. Jonathan St. B. T. Evans & Keith E. Stanovich, Dual-Process Theories of Higher 
Cognition: Advancing the Debate, 8 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 223, 223–24 (2013). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See, e.g., John A. Bargh & Ezequiel Marsella, The Unconscious Mind, 3 PERSP. 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 73, 75 (2008) (“The idea that action precedes reflection is not new . . . . [C]on-
scious processes kick in after a behavioral impulse has occurred in the brain—that is, the 
impulse is first generated unconsciously, and then consciousness claims (and experiences) it 
as its own.”). 
 79. See Antonio R. Damasio et al., The Somatic Marker Hypothesis and the Possible 
Functions of the Prefrontal Cortex, 351 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1413 
(1996). See generally ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, THE FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS: BODY AND 
EMOTION IN THE MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS 35–81 (1999) [hereinafter DAMASIO, BODY 
AND EMOTION]. 
 80. See generally Aaron Sloman, Damasio’s Error, THE PHIL. MAG. 5 (2004), 
https://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/phil-mag-emotions-sloman.pdf (critiqu-
ing Antonio Damasio’s theories and reasoning on emotional reactions). 
 81. See Evans & Stanovich, supra note 74, at 223–24. 
 82. Low, supra note 26, at 102–03 (applying dual-process theories to judicial reasoning 
and inhibition of System 1 processing). 
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and its coextensive biases operate on an autonomous level, and higher-order 
thought may be able to counteract its more pro-aggressive effects. 
Research suggests, however, that higher-order intervention may not be 
effective in every context.83 When people make implicit, unconscious deci-
sion-making explicit, they may be less in accordance with experts and less 
satisfied with their decision.84 Additionally, for basic decision-making, intui-
tive processes may be more effective at coming to better decisions.85 This 
may be because the vast amount of decision-making comes from implicit 
processing.86 Later, this paper will assess the effects of System 1 and System 
2 processing on judges. 
III. EMPATHY IMPACTS JUDGES AND CRIMINAL SENTENCES 
The empathetic distortions outlined above impact sentencing in vari-
ous ways. First, this section addresses the contention that judges may be dif-
ferent from the average person, concluding that generally-applicable conclu-
sions about cognition are also applicable to judges. Then, this section 
addresses federal criminal sentencing, analyzing empathy as a possible 
source of distortion through discussions of white-collar sentencing and vic-
tim impact statements. 
A. Studies of Judges Show They Are Subject to Similar Processing and Bi-
ases as Anyone Else 
There are some reasons to believe that judges have somewhat different 
attributes than the average person. Judges have been through law school. 
Legal scholarship values “abstract rationality,” devaluing emotion.87 After 
discussion of the mechanisms of empathy and bias, however, it may come 
as no surprise to hear that judges do make systematic cognitive errors,88 like 
                                                           
 83. Christian Keysers et al., Explicit and Implicit Strategies in Decision Making, in BET-
TER THAN CONSCIOUS?: DECISION MAKING, THE HUMAN MIND, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
INSTITUTIONS 225, 244 (Christoph Engel & Wolf Singer eds., 2008). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Marius Usher et al., The Impact of the Mode of Thought in Complex Decisions: 
Intuitive Decisions Are Better, 2 FRONTIERS PSYCHOL. 1, 9 (2011) (“The four experiments 
reported here provide support for the claim that intuitive–affective strategies can outperform 
deliberation/analytic strategies in value integration, an operation that is critical for complex 
decision-making.”). 
 86. See generally DAMASIO, BODY AND EMOTION, supra note 79 (discussing the role 
of implicit processing in decision-making). 
 87. See Angela P. Harris & Marjorie M. Shultz, A(nother) Critique of Pure Reason: 
Toward Civic Virtue in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1773, 1775, 1805 (1993). 
 88. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial 
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 779 (2001) (“Empirical evidence suggests that even highly 
qualified judges inevitably rely on cognitive decision-making processes that can produce sys-
tematic errors in judgment.”). 
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most people. They also have the same amount of implicit bias as laypeople.89 
These effects occur even though the public’s expectation is that judicial of-
ficers make only occasional mistakes.90 
Judges are also subject to the same distortions and biases as an average 
person.91 These include, in addition to empathetic distortions, anchoring bi-
ases, framing biases, hindsight bias, representativeness heuristics, and ego-
centric biases.92 Each of these “cognitive illusions” distorts decision-making 
through the use of heuristics, or cognitive shortcuts.93 Cognitive illusions are 
not the only way that judicial decision-making may be distorted. For exam-
ple, judges issue significantly less favorable parole decisions as time passes 
since their last meal break.94 
Whether through cognitive distortions or otherwise, identity biases 
play a systematic role in judicial decision-making.95 For example, gender is 
relevant to judicial decisions. Though female judges rarely decide cases dif-
ferently from male judges, they do decide sex discrimination disputes dif-
ferently and can help shift a panel’s decision-making.96 Similar effects also 
occur in sexual harassment cases.97 When judges have daughters, they are 
                                                           
 89. Suja A. Thomas, What Judges Can Do About Implicit Bias, JOTWELL (May 22, 
2017) (reviewing Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Implicit Bias in Judicial Deci-
sion Making: How It Affects Judgment and What Judges Can Do About It, in ENSURING 
JUSTICE: REDUCING BIAS 87 (Sarah Redfield ed., 2017)), https://courtslaw.jotwell.com/what-
judges-can-do-about-implicit-bias/. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See Guthrie, Rachlinski, & Wistrich, supra note 88, at 784 (summarizing findings 
of judicial decision making studies conducted for various cognitive biases and influences). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Shai Danziger, Jonathan Levav & Liora Avnaim-Pesso, Extraneous Factors in Judi-
cial Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 6889, 6892 (2011). 
 95. Adam N. Glynn & Maya Sen, Identifying Judicial Empathy: Does Having Daugh-
ters Cause Judges to Rule for Women’s Issues?, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 37, 52–53 (2015) 
(“Third, this fact has broader implications for descriptive representation on the courts. Schol-
arship has demonstrated that female judges decide cases differently from men, and that Af-
rican Americans also decide cases differently from whites. However, what we see here is that 
male judges who have daughters are more likely to vote in a liberal direction—despite not 
having those ascriptive characteristics that would otherwise be linked to more progressive 
views on women’s rights issues.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 96. See Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin. Untangling the Causal 
Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 406 (2010) (statistically analyzing the 
likelihood of a ruling in favor of the plaintiff based on the gender makeup of the panel of 
judges). 
 97. Jennifer L. Peresie, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking 
in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1761 (2005) (analyzing a data set to 
find that for Title VII sex discrimination and sexual harassment cases, “female judges were 
significantly more likely than male judges to find for plaintiffs”). 
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more likely to vote in a more feminist fashion on gender issues.98 Con-
versely, male judges may also side with rapists and domestic abusers more 
frequently than other defendants, as male judges find it easier to empathize 
with predominantly male defendants.99 
Race also affects judicial decision-making. For cases brought under the 
Voting Rights Act, race plays a more prominent role in judicial decision-
making than other factors, such as ideology.100 Other studies show that white 
judges are less likely to believe that employees have “credible grievances of 
racial harassment,” even though both African American and white judges 
agree on the relevant factual features of the cases.101 Given race’s prominent 
effect on judicial decision-making, and the already-present racial disparities 
in the criminal justice system,102 solutions which mitigate empathy-sourced 
racial sentencing disparities are particularly important. 
Studies show that politics can affect a judge’s decision-making in lim-
ited ways,103 but other studies question the significance of this, suggesting that 
political party affiliation does not change how judges rule on, for example, 
summary judgment in employment civil rights cases.104 Overall, judges expe-
rience sufficient cognitive distortions to suggest that larger-scale cognitive 
processing findings which apply to the general public apply to them as well. 
B. How Does Federal Sentencing Work? 
An understanding of United States sentencing policy helps one under-
stand how findings on empathy, cognitive heuristics, and bias affect judicial 
                                                           
 98. Glynn & Sen, supra note 95, at 52 (“[A]cross cases involving gender issues, judges 
who parent daughters as opposed to sons are more likely to reach liberal decisions . . . .”). 
 99. Susan Bandes, supra note 59, at 376–77 (“[E]asy identification for the judge . . . is 
more often true in cases of rape and domestic violence, in which predominantly male judges 
find it easier to make the empathetic link with male defendants, than in cases of other 
crimes.”). 
 100. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 53 (2008) (providing statistical analysis demonstrating that “a judge’s race and 
partisan affiliation are important determinants of liability in [Voting Rights Act] section 2 
cases”). 
 101. Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical 
Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1161 (2009). 
 102. See Radley Balko, 21 More Studies Showing Racial Disparities in the Criminal Jus-
tice System, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opin-
ions/2019/04/09/more-studies-showing-racial-disparities-criminal-justice-system/ (providing 
summaries of twenty-one studies conducted between 2008 and 2018 quantifying current ra-
cial disparities in the United States criminal justice system). 
 103. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006) (providing a high-level analysis of judicial ap-
pointees and their decision-making based on their political party, finding party affiliation 
highly predictive only on abortion and capital punishment). 
 104. Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy: Discrimination, Ex-
perience, and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 320–21 (2012). 
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decision-making during punishment. In the current United States federal 
court system, sentencing guidelines set the standard sentences for a given 
charge, factoring in mitigating and aggravating factors to create a suggested 
sentence.105 Since the passage of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, down-
ward departures have been gradually increasing.106 
Several United States Supreme Court cases have affected how courts 
may apply the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.107 Blakely v. Washington held 
that maximum sentences could not exceed the maximum sentence which 
could be imposed for a crime without additional judicial findings.108 In 
United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court then determined that sen-
tences were unconstitutional when based on judge-found facts.109 These de-
cisions made Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory, instead of manda-
tory.110 After Booker, many federal courts further reduced the effect of the 
Guidelines.111 
These decisions occurred in a landscape of difficult and changing sen-
tencing issues. Prior to the Federal Guidelines, courts exercised indetermi-
nate sentencing, which was almost unfettered discretion.112 Now, the advi-
sory Guidelines help judges come to decisions. These decisions do not need 
to follow proportionality standards,113 and district courts may deviate from 
                                                           
 105. Joshua B. Fischman & Max M. Schanzenbach, Do Standards of Review Matter? 
The Case of Federal Criminal Sentencing, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 405–06 (2011). 
 106. Becky Gregory & Traci Kenner, A New Era in Federal Sentencing, 68 TEX. B.J. 
796, 798 (2005) (“[D]ownward departures steadily increase[d] from 20 percent to 35 percent 
during the previous eight years.”). 
 107. See Carol A. Pettit, Writing the Book(er) on Blakely: The Challenge to the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 41 TULSA L. REV. 365 (2005) (covering legal challenges to Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines and how cases have impacted implementation of those guidelines). 
 108. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304 (2004) (“The judge in this case could 
not have imposed the exceptional 90–month sentence solely on the basis of the facts admit-
ted in the guilty plea.”). 
 109. Pettit, supra note 107, at 366. 
 110. Id. at 369. 
 111. Id. at 366–67 (“Initially a number of federal district courts found the Guidelines 
unconstitutional. Some held the Federal Sentencing Guidelines wholly unconstitu-
tional, while others found them salvageable through severability. Those holding the Guide-
lines unconstitutional, whether in whole or in part, disagreed about how sentences should be 
determined post-Blakely. Some preferred a return to indeterminate sentencing using 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as actual guidelines rather than as mandates. Others be-
lieved the Guidelines were still valid so long as the sentence imposed would not exceed the 
maximum presumptive sentence.”). 
 112. See generally Adam Shajnfeld, The Eleventh Circuit’s Selective Assault on Sentenc-
ing Discretion, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1133, 1133–37 (2011) (discussing the evolution of fed-
eral sentencing law). 
 113. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007) (“[Judges] may not presume 
that the Guidelines range is reasonable. [They] must make an individualized assessment 
based on the facts presented.”). 
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the ranges based on policy disagreement.114 Decisions must merely be “rea-
sonable.”115 
During balancing tests, judges often have to weigh the balances of jus-
tice, and this necessarily implicates the exercise of empathy.116 Judges are 
allowed discretion in, for example, compassionate release and asylum 
cases.117 The federal sentencing guidelines create a unique situation, how-
ever, because outcomes are partially dictated by maximum and minimum 
penalties.118 Though this system was intended to be more fair, some judges 
believe that the low limits of the federal guidelines are unfair when applied 
to certain cases.119 Some of these judges have resigned or refused to comply 
with the guidelines.120 
Proponents of the guidelines offer familiar retributive proportionality 
arguments. For example, they suggest that the guidelines enable judges to 
only punish charged conduct121 and make punishments fairer.122 The guide-
lines also prevent judges from imposing unjust consecutive sentences.123 
                                                           
 114. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 93 (2007) (explaining that the De-
fendant’s sentence was shorter than the Guidelines recommended because the Court felt the 
crack cocaine Guidelines were “disproportionate and unjust”). 
 115. See generally Shajnfeld, supra note 112, 1137–38 (discussing different interpreta-
tions of “reasonableness” review). 
 116. See Bandes, supra note 21, at 186 (discussing the Justices’ application of empathy 
in a Supreme Court oral argument about the strip search of a thirteen-year-old). 
 117. See id. at 187 (discussing contexts where judicial compassion is explicitly permit-
ted). 
 118. See id. at 187–88 (addressing compassion and federal sentencing guidelines). 
 119. See id. (“[T]he guidelines impose mandatory minimum sentences that have 
shocked the conscience of many judges—decades in prison for a first time, low-level drug 
offence . . . .”). 
 120. See id. (addressing compassion’s role as a “stopgap” for the federal sentencing 
guidelines—a role that empathy may also share). 
 121. See Pettit, supra note 107, at 403 (“Punishment for real conduct is something that 
Justice Breyer has maintained is an essential part of the Congress’s goal for the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines — so essential that in his view, Congress would have preferred that the 
Guidelines be only advisory rather than to have modified judges’ ability to punish real con-
duct. ‘Real conduct’ is a euphemism for uncharged conduct that is not subject to the usual 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 122. See Sarah Hyser, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: How Federal Courts Took 
the “Fair” Out of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 503, 512 (2012) 
(“In April 2009, President Barack Obama’s administration expressed a desire to end the sen-
tencing disparity. The following month, the House of Representatives held a subcommittee 
hearing to discuss the issue of reforming crack sentencing and to consider five proposed 
bills.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 123. Jon O. Newman, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Good Idea Badly Imple-
mented, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 805, 813 (2018) (“The Guidelines curb abusive use of consec-
utive sentences by providing that sentences for defendants convicted of multiple counts 
should run concurrently, with just two exceptions.” (internal citation omitted)). 
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In the judicial process, the appellate system generally reduces the ef-
fects of an individual judge’s personal preferences.124 This may have less of 
an effect in sentencing, where judges may make decisions under a lenient 
standard of review. Under current law, the federal standard of appellate re-
view for criminal sentences is a deferential “abuse of discretion” standard.125 
Evidence suggests that judges change their sentencing decisions based on 
the standard on which their decisions are reviewed.126 
As addressed before, one of the primary concerns of those who reject 
empathy in the judiciary is that it might obscure the judge’s ability to assess 
the balance of the law, as it might cause undue bias towards one side of the 
case. Given the wide discretion judges have in criminal sentencing, the im-
portant role of empathy in such proceedings is difficult to ignore, for people 
on all sides of the greater empathy debate.127 
C. A Note on Prosecutors and the Federal Guidelines 
Important to any discussion of punishment is an acknowledgement of 
the realities of American sentencing. From 2006 to 2016, the “number of 
criminal trials declined by 47%, and the jury trial rate declined by almost 
40%.”128 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines may contribute to this trend, as 
“[a]cceptance of responsibility and substantial assistance reductions are the 
two most common ways defendants can mitigate their sentences.”129 These 
“normally entail admissions of guilt and . . . follow guilty pleas.”130 In fact, 
some argue that the “most glaring change imposed by” the shift to determi-
nate sentencing is a “shift in sentencing discretion from the judge to the 
                                                           
 124. See Brandy A. Karl, Why Judges’ Personal Preferences Play A Role in Their De-
cisionmaking, and How the Appellate System Controls That Role, FINDLAW (Jan. 8, 2003), 
https://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/why-judges-personal-preferences-play-a-
role-in-their-decisionmaking-and-how-the-appellate-system-controls-that-role.html. 
 125. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 56 (2007) (“[T]he appropriate standard of review 
was abuse of discretion.”). 
 126. Joshua B. Fischman & Max M. Schanzenbach, Do Standards of Review Matter? 
The Case of Federal Criminal Sentencing, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 431 (2011) (“Changes to 
standards of review clearly have an impact on district judges’ sentencing behavior.”). 
 127. See Colby, supra note 18, at 1996 n.248 (describing a “limited” role of empathy as 
still encompassing criminal sentencing, and pointing out Justice Scalia’s support for empathy 
in criminal sentencing). 
 128. The Honorable Robert J. Conrad, Jr. & Katy L. Clements, The Vanishing Criminal 
Jury Trial: From Trial Judges to Sentencing Judges, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 105 (2018). 
 129. Id. at 122. 
 130. Id. 
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prosecutor.”131 Many other factors also contribute to the plea deal trend, re-
sulting in a system where defense attorneys accept pleas because those deals 
are in their client’s best interest.132 
Due to the decline in criminal trials and rise in plea deals, prosecutors 
are often the people who are in charge of determining a defendant’s sen-
tence.133 Prosecutors likely face empathetic biases similar to judges, with 
added distortions caused by the adversarial system. Though an investigation 
of the role of empathy and bias in prosecutors is likely warranted, this paper 
addresses judicial bias, as likely trial sentences constrain the plea options 
that prosecutors may offer.134 
D. Combining Bias, Punishment, and Judging: Fairness and White-Collar 
Criminals 
White-collar criminal cases provide particularly interesting insights 
into the role of bias in sentencing. Judges generally share attributes with 
white-collar criminals, including race and employment status.135 White-collar 
criminals can also often call on a network of people to vouch for their inter-
ests during sentencing,136 which may cause a judge to weigh a sentence from 
the defendant’s point of view. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given these facts and 
the above findings on judicial bias, judges often issue mitigated sentences to 
                                                           
 131. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES 2004: 
AN EXPERIMENT THAT HAS FAILED 14 (2004), https://www.actl.com/docs/default-source/de-
fault-document-library/newsroom/united_states_sentencing_guidelines_2004_an_experi-
ment_that_has_failed. 
 132. See generally Conrad, Jr. & Clement, supra note 128 (2018) (explaining that in ad-
dition to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, other factors such as mandatory minimum sen-
tences, precedential United States Supreme Court cases, United States Attorneys General’s 
prosecutorial policies, stronger evidence due to technological advancement, expense, and 
overarching expectations directly contribute to the increase in plea deals). 
 133. See AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 131, at 14 (“The most glaring change 
imposed by this sentencing system over the last decade and a half has been the shift in sen-
tencing discretion from the judge to the prosecutor.”). 
 134. Cf. Conrad, Jr. & Clement, supra note 128, at 119 (“[C]harging fewer [mandatory 
minimum penalties] could result in prosecutors offering more attractive plea terms . . . .”). 
 135. See Peter J. Henning, The Challenge of Sentencing White-Collar Criminals, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/12/business/dealbook/sentenc-
ing-white-collar-criminals.html (“White-collar defendants often have more in common with 
the federal judge who will sentence them than most criminals do.”); see also Paul M. 
Klenowski & Kimberly D. Dodson, Who Commits White-Collar Crime, and What Do We 
Know About Them?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 2–3 (Shanna 
R. Van Slyke et al. eds., 2016) (summarizing findings of various studies that describe the 
“demographic profile” of white-collar criminals). 
 136. See Henning, supra note 135 (“White-collar defendants . . . can generate letters 
from family and friends attesting to their generosity and good works—something that is not 
likely to come up in sentencing a drug trafficker.”). 
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white-collar defendants.137 Most white-collar defendants in a federal district 
known for prosecuting white-collar crimes receive sentences shorter than 
the federal guidelines recommend.138 
White-collar criminals have caused unique sentencing issues for some 
time. The sentencing guidelines for white-collar criminals have shifted over 
the years.139 These guidelines were designed, in part, to make the playing 
field between white-collar criminals and other criminals fairer.140 The dispar-
ity in mitigated sentences between white collar and violent crime may be 
due to factors aside from bias. For example, white collar sentencing guide-
lines may be generally high141 or may be primarily related to the amount of 
money lost.142 Adhering to such guidelines may prevent a judge from engag-
ing in empathetic interest balancing. For example, a judge’s degree of favor 
towards retributive philosophy does not generally affect the severity with 
which they sentence white-collar criminals.143 
Empathy still likely has some impact on white collar sentencing, how-
ever. For example, philosophies of mercy affect the sentence length of 
white-collar criminals.144 The presence of such mercy has been tested using 
empathy-triggering statements such as “‘[p]eople who commit serious 
                                                           
 137. See Jillian Hewitt, Fifty Shades of Gray: Sentencing Trends in Major White-Collar 
Cases, 125 YALE L.J. 1018, 1059–60 (2016) (writing that in white-collar cases, “the govern-
ment . . . sponsor[s] below-range sentences on the basis of cooperation, and the court . . . fre-
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Guidelines.”). 
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lar Fraud Sentencing: An Empirical Study Revealing the Need for Further Reform, 102 
IOWA L. REV. 939, 942–43 (2017) (briefly detailing the changes the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines have gone through since the 1980s). 
 140. Id. at 947–49. 
 141. See id. at 975 n.151 (“[S]ome defense advocacy groups[ ] feel that the guideline is 
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The Disappointing Denouement of the Sentencing Commission’s Economic Crime Project 
(and What They Should Do Now), 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 270, 271 (2015)). 
 142. Walter Pavlo, Few Meaningful Changes Proposed on White Collar Crime Sen-
tences, FORBES (Apr. 15, 2015, 7:35 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/wal-
terpavlo/2015/04/15/few-meaningful-changes-proposed-on-white-collar-crime-sen-
tences/#6d8227ad6e70 (“The primary driver that determines a prison term in an economic 
crime is the dollar amount ‘lost’ in the crime.”). 
 143. See Bennett, Levinson, & Hioki, supra note 139 at 971 (“Despite the differences in 
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crimes often should receive treatment instead of punishment,’ and ‘[p]eople 
who commit serious crimes sometimes deserve leniency.’”145 
There is a perfect storm in favor of empathy towards white-collar crim-
inals. On top of their often-similar identities, white-collar criminals such as 
fraudsters and corporate criminals engage in financial crimes. Such crimes 
lack tangible violence that might otherwise arouse empathetic violence 
within judges. Remember, strong emotional experiences are more likely to 
arouse empathetic reactions. Without empathetic triggers, judges may find 
it difficult to issue high sentences. 
Note that this paper does not necessarily intend to argue that white-
collar criminals should not receive mitigated sentences nor necessarily that 
violent criminals should be treated more leniently in comparison to white-
collar criminals. Studying the sentencing of white-collar criminals illustrates 
how empathy during the sentencing process works and how it might con-
tribute to disparity. The contributions of cognitive effects and empathy may 
help explain the difficulties that judges and legislatures have in comparing 
white collar sentences to sentences issued to violent offenders. Given that 
white collar criminal demographics align disproportionately with judicial de-
mographics,146 white-collar crime also provides an example of how une-
qually-applied empathy could lead to racial disparity within the criminal jus-
tice system. 
E. Empathy and Punishment: Victim Impact Statements and the Distortive 
Effects of Empathy 
In many contexts, judges are constrained by the law. This has been a 
central theme of those who argue against empathy in judicial decision mak-
ing.147 The federal sentencing rules and the cases that came thereafter, how-
ever, allow judges significant leeway in deciding sentences. Judges are even 
encouraged to exercise their empathetic impulses during sentencing. 
“[C]riminal law is one of the few areas of doctrine in which an examination 
or assessment of emotions . . . has been a standard feature of the doctrinal 
and adjudicative landscape.”148 Empathy, then, plays a crucial role in crimi-
nal sentencing.149 Still, empathy may foster both positive and negative effects. 
                                                           
 145. Id. 
 146. See Henning, supra note 135. 
 147. See Corso, supra note 10, at 100–01 (describing the main arguments against “the 
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It can cause bias in favor of those who are similar to the judge,150 but it might 
also reduce the amount of unjust punishment that a judge might be willing 
to inflict.151 
In some ways, the criminal justice system is geared to elicit directed 
empathy in certain ways. Take, for example, victim impact statements. Such 
statements help “prime” a judge’s empathy, which could trigger the judge to 
have a narrow view of their sentencing decision. In this way, judicial empa-
thy may focus on the victims of crime more than it focuses on defendants. 
If this happens, sentences would be more severe than merited. This paper 
does not address in detail whether judges should think about society in gen-
eral or defendants and victims in particular during sentencing. Still, a per-
spective shift towards the victims of crime may result in distortions during 
sentencing. Since high levels of emotions trigger empathy and crimes often 
entail very high levels of emotion, the judge may issue harsher rulings in 
cases with victim impact statements. This paper is not the first to discuss the 
possible distortive effects of such statements.152 Another author who has writ-
ten extensively on the effects of emotion in law has argued that “victim im-
pact statements are narratives that should be suppressed because they evoke 
emotions inappropriate in the context of criminal sentencing [such as] ha-
tred, . . . undifferentiated vengeance, and even bigotry.”153 
Victim statements offer a valuable opportunity for victims to speak dur-
ing the criminal justice process. When the State files criminal charges, the 
prosecutor makes the decisions and the agency of victims may be dimin-
ished. However, whether these statements should be presented before a 
sentencing judge, subject to the same cognitive biases as everyday people, is 
still an important question. 
IV. HOW MIGHT JUDGES APPLY EMPATHY APPROPRIATELY 
DURING SENTENCING? 
Crucial to the criminal sentencing process is the determination of the 
role of punishment.154 Judges may choose to punish on utilitarian grounds 
                                                           
 150. Bennett, Levinson, & Hioki, supra note 139, at 947 (“White-collar defendants re-
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the academic writing on narratives and victim impact statements). 
 153. Bandes, supra note 59, at 365. 
 154. See generally Hugo Adam Bedau & Erin Kelly, Punishment, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA 
PHIL., (July 31, 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/punishment/. 
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to serve a purpose such as deterrence.155 Alternatively, incapacitation would 
suggest that a person should be punished to separate them from society in 
order to prevent further harm.156 Judges may also choose to punish on re-
tributive grounds to give the criminal a deserved punishment.157 Other pun-
ishment justifications exist in a vast literature, such as communitarian-fo-
cused punishment or educative punishment.158 Each punishment 
justification has different implications for the role of empathy. 
For example, if a judge punishes a convicted person on purely inca-
pacitative grounds, they may not need to employ empathy in their decision-
making. Incapacitation would logically result from the likelihood of future 
harm. Empathy is unable to assess the factors associated with recidivism. 
Such harm could, however, be calculated without emotion. For example, 
assume that gender, age, crime severity, social support, and other factors 
correlate with a certain likelihood of re-offense. To embrace empathetic 
impulses under such a framework would be irrelevant to the calculation. 
Empathy for possible future victims may be triggered, but not to the point 
of changing the calculus. 
For a retributivist, empathy helps the judge understand the mental state 
of the defendant, which can help the judge determine how deserving of pun-
ishment the person is. For an example, compare two cases of a baby’s hom-
icide. In the first, someone negligently leaves a baby in a car seat. In the 
second, someone intentionally and maliciously stabs a baby. The former 
person may be “deserving” of less punishment than the latter due to their 
less culpable mental state. Empathetic brain-states would help the judge con-
sider each defendant’s perspective, and may require the judge to reckon 
with each defendant’s moral framework. This could enable a judge to come 
to a reasoned decision about punishment. Empathy for the victim may also 
be useful, as it might help the judge assess the severity of harm. Still, this 
type of retributive judge may want to be mindful of the vengeance-triggering 
effects of empathy. 
Under some retributive frameworks, however, aggression on behalf of 
the victim may even be beneficial. An example of this framework comes 
from James Fitzjames Stephen, a retributivist who believes that punishment 
is morally justified because it gives satisfaction through the expression of 
hatred.159 He has argued, “[i]t [is] highly desirable that criminals should be 
hated, and that punishments inflicted upon them should be so contrived as 
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to give expression to that hatred . . . .”160 Under this retributive framework, 
the empathetic aggression of the judge may channel that of the victim and 
society, causing a just expression of criminal hatred. Judicial anger may have 
varying effects, independent of those caused by empathy.161 Still, unchecked 
empathetic aggression in these cases may cloud a judge’s perspective, pre-
venting a reasoned, moral sentence. 
Some retributive punishment may not require empathy to decide pun-
ishments. Some retributivists might prefer a strict ordinal/cardinal sentenc-
ing structure,162 focusing on a crime’s effects more than the defendant’s cul-
pability. On this view, empathy may obscure an otherwise mechanical 
operation to decide the appropriate punishment. It might weigh towards the 
victim or the defendant unfairly, based on the judge’s bias or identity. 
For a utilitarian, empathy may play a number of different roles. Gen-
eral empathy for people in society may trigger a concern for the ideals of 
deterrence. Empathy for the criminal might trigger a utilitarian limit to pun-
ishment, causing the judge to not impose punishment on the person that 
does not serve a consequential purpose. It may also cause a judge to be 
better able to assess the effects of punishment on an individual and its ben-
efits to society. Under some utilitarian conceptions, however, it would play 
no role. For example, a utilitarian might suggest that the balance of utility 
cannot be approximated through empathy. Under this account, the distor-
tions of empathy outweigh its benefits, and mere calculated standards are 
preferable. 
Rehabilitative theories could use judicial empathy for the better. If the 
purpose of the theory is to better an individual, empathy may be required 
to assess the individual’s state and to tailor a program that would work with 
that person. Rehabilitative programs often focus on the offender, so the ag-
gression-inducing effects of focusing on victims may be mitigated. 
Empathy may also help judges understand what sentences look like. 
Though judges might not fully understand what it is like to be an imprisoned 
individual, an understanding of the experiences of imprisoned people could 
help judges weigh the effects of prison sentences on people convicted of 
charges. Understanding the long-standing harms experienced by formerly 
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incarcerated people may also be possible through exposure to such situa-
tions combined with the natural empathetic response.163 
V. RECOGNIZING THE EFFECTS OF COGNITIVE DISTOR-
TIONS SUCH AS EMPATHY CAN HELP JUDGES BE FAIRER 
SENTENCERS 
Judges may benefit from longer, thought-out cognitive processing. 
Though sentences within the federal guidelines may not require detailed 
elaboration, judicial decisions must be accompanied by a legally sufficient 
explanation.164 Sentencing that deviates from the sentencing guidelines must 
come with an adequate explanation for the deviation.165 This means that 
judges cannot rely on automatic processes and must generally check their 
reasoning thoroughly.166 Judges are not making decisions for their own per-
sonal benefit, so they are not able to rely as easily on the studies suggesting 
that intuition creates better personal outcomes. Research generally suggests 
that knowing about bias, and consciously checking for such bias, helps com-
bat the effects of such bias.167 Automatic processes such as empathy have the 
capacity to create systemic inequities in the way cases are decided, because 
it addresses how individuals relate to judges.168 For these reasons, refining 
                                                           
 163. See Katie J. MacDowell, Thinking Beyond Ban the Box: How to Alleviate Dispro-
portionate Sentencing to Assist Ex-Offenders in Rejoining Society, 25 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
809, 810–11 (2018) (describing the post-prison effects of sentences on formerly incarcerated 
individuals). 
 164. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 339 (2007) (“[T]he sentencing judge should 
articulate enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments 
and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking [sic] authority. He may 
say less when his decision rests upon the Commission’s own reasoning that the Guidelines 
sentence is proper in the typical case, and the judge has found that the case before him is 
typical.”); see also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 666 A.2d 690 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (applying 
sentencing explanation standards to two counts on appeal, with differing outcomes). 
 165. See United States v. Ballard, 950 F.3d 434, 439 (7th Cir. 2020) (“Because the dis-
trict court did not provide an adequate explanation for the extreme upward departure from 
Ballard’s recommended Guidelines range, we hold that it committed procedural error.”). 
 166. Cf. R. George Wright, The Role of Intuition in Judicial Decisionmaking, 42 HOUS. 
L. REV. 1381, 1420–21 (2006) (“Crucially, an opinion accompanying an intuitionist outcome 
can itself amount to reasonable evidence that the judge has taken full, careful, empathetic, 
and detailed account of all of the main interests and concerns of the opposing and other 
affected parties. In this way, the opinion can properly add to (or inadvertently undermine) 
the persuasiveness and legitimacy of even an intuition-based outcome.”). 
 167. See, e.g., Alexander R. Green et al., Implicit Bias Among Physicians and its Predic-
tion of Thrombolysis Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 
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 168. See Corso, supra note 10, at 101 (“If empathy is identified with sympathy or com-
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the ability of higher-order processes to intervene on lower-order processes 
may benefit the field of law.169 
Given that judges will experience empathy, the question arises as to 
whether they should put their empathy aside or “integrate their feelings with 
those of the subject being judged; law and precedent setting a broad frame-
work.”170 
A. Guidelines Are Not Enough 
Sentencing guidelines alone are unlikely to be an effective way to com-
bat biases in the criminal justice system. Though this technique may be ef-
fective at limiting the spread of divergent outcomes, the freedom within 
which judges decide sentences means that recognizing and combating bias 
is still important.171 Guidelines might also constrain the ability of a judge to 
do the right thing in certain circumstances.172 
B. Mindfulness 
Mindfulness can play a key role in regulating one’s emotions. The ideal 
of a mindful judge has long roots in legal scholarship, as articles have sug-
gested that judges who recognize their own prejudices and biases may nullify 
the effect of such biases.173 For a long time, “introspective self-criticism [and] 
attempting to feel empathy” have been offered as solutions to discrimination 
in judging.174 Given that “[p]ersonal experience, identification, [and] com-
passion” “will always influence decision-making,” judges can examine and 
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evaluate compassionate impulses and “determine whether they are rele-
vant.”175 Mindfulness, along with other emotional-regulation techniques, can 
allow judges to experience the positive effects of emotions without the harm-
ful effects of emotional suppression.176 
Fatigue, depleted resources, and multitasking can lower a judge’s abil-
ity to adjudicate fairly.177 These effects, as well as empathetic distortive ef-
fects, can be mitigated by tackling the central issues. If over-work causes 
judges to resort to System 1 processing and use heuristics and biases,178 then 
a reduction of judicial workload may be in order. If judges are sentencing 
more harshly before their lunch break,179 then mandated breaks may be cru-
cial to a just system. Reflective mindfulness can help judges assess why they 
decide what they decide, improving sentencing decisions.180 Empathy will 
affect judicial decisions, and self-awareness of such empathy can help judges 
come to just decisions. 
In an adversarial system, the key may also be to cultivate compassion 
instead of empathy. Still, compassion is not the only emotion that judges 
must employ, as empathy maintains a strong role when judges are sentenc-
ing under specific philosophical rationales. “[M]oral outrage by and on be-
half of the victims of injustice” may play a stronger role,181 depending on a 
judge’s punishment rationale. Healthy emotional regulation can help pre-
vent negative effects of various emotional states.182 
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C. Diverse Judicial Panels 
Another solution to the sentencing issue lies in having a panel of judges 
decide sentences. Since judges on a panel affect other judges’ perspectives, 
causing them to consider other viewpoints, having diverse panels of judges 
consider sentencing decisions would help mitigate the effects of empathetic 
bias. Studies already suggest that judges are highly affected by other judges 
with whom they share panels.183 Other authors have already recommended 
increasing diversity on the bench.184 Diverse judicial panels can cause judges 
to change their views, reducing the effects of disparate empathy.185 The neg-
ative effects of empathy may therefore be outweighed by the benefit of 
group work. Having a set of judges with different perspectives, and different 
propensities to empathize with different sides in the system, may enable just 
decision-making to prevail. 
Necessary to this concept would be a panel with different empathetic 
distortions. If the panel was composed of judges with identical life experi-
ence, then that panel might empathize with the perspective of one side of 
the conflict more than another.186 Discussion among diverse judges may help 
them come to a more holistic understanding of the conflict. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Empathy is a capacity that everyone experiences. Legal discourse 
should accommodate this reality by addressing how it might be used to 
come to more just sentencing decisions. Important to this process is focus-
ing on all sides of a conflict, empowering victims without enabling empa-
thetic aggression in judges, diversifying the judiciary, and creating judicial 
panels for sentencing decisions. If these proposals are followed, judges will 
be able to work with the sentencing guidelines, issuing fairer sentences and 
reducing disparities in the justice system. 
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